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Member States should endeavour to ensure a more efficient and coordinated approach to deal with financial investigations related to terrorism, including those related to the misuse of virtual currencies.
In the exercise of their tasks, FIUs should have access to information and be able to exchange it without impediments, including through appropriate cooperation with law enforcement authorities.
In all cases of suspected criminality and, in particular, in cases involving the financing of terrorism, information should flow directly and quickly without undue delays.
It is therefore essential to further enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of FIUs, by clarifying the powers of and cooperation between FIUs. FIUs should be able to obtain from any obliged entity all the necessary information relating to their functions.
Their unfettered access to information is essential to ensure that flows of money can be properly traced and illicit networks and flows detected at an early stage.
FIUs should therefore in the context of their functions be able to obtain information from any obliged entity, even without a prior report being made.
This does not include indiscriminate requests for information to the obliged entities in the context of the FIU's analysis, but only information requests based on sufficiently defined conditions.
The purpose of the FIU is to collect and analyse the information which they receive with the aim of establishing links between suspicious transactions and underlying criminal activity in order to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and to disseminate the results of its analysis as well as additional information to the competent authorities where there are grounds to suspect money laundering, associated predicate offences or financing of terrorism.
An FIU should not refrain from or refuse the exchange of information to another FIU, spontaneously or upon request, for reasons such as a lack of identification of an associated predicate offence, features of criminal national laws and differences between the definitions of associated predicate offences or the absence of a reference to particular associated predicate offences.
Similarly, an FIU should grant its prior consent to another FIU to forward the information to competent authorities regardless of the type of possible associated predicate offence in order to allow the dissemination function to be carried out effectively.
FIUs have reported difficulties in exchanging information based on differences in national definitions of certain predicate offences, such as tax crimes, which are not harmonised by Union law.
Such differences, should not hamper the mutual exchange, the dissemination to competent authorities and the use of that information as defined by this Directive.
Delayed access to information by FIUs and other competent authorities on the identity of holders of bank and payment accounts and safe-deposit boxes, especially anonymous ones, hampers the detection of transfers of funds relating to terrorism.
National data allowing the identification of bank and payments accounts and safe-deposit boxes belonging to one person is fragmented and therefore not accessible to FIUs and to other competent authorities in a timely manner.
It is therefore essential to establish centralised automated mechanisms, such as a register or data retrieval system, in all Member States as an efficient means to get timely access to information on the identity of holders of bank and payment accounts and safe-deposit boxes, their proxy holders, and their beneficial owners.
When applying the access provisions, it is appropriate for pre-existing mechanisms to be used provided that national FIUs can access the data for which they make inquiries in an immediate and unfiltered manner.
Member States should consider feeding such mechanisms with other information deemed necessary and proportionate for the more effective mitigation of risks relating to money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
Full confidentiality should be ensured in respect of such inquiries and requests for related information by FIUs and competent authorities other than those authorities responsible for prosecution.
It should be possible for Member States to determine which data it is useful and proportionate to gather, taking into account the systems and legal traditions in place to enable the meaningful identification of the beneficial owners.
When transposing the provisions relating to those mechanisms, Member States should set out retention periods equivalent to the period for retention of the documentation and information obtained within the application of customer due diligence measures.
It should be possible for Member States to extend the retention period on a general basis by law, without requiring case-by-case decisions. The additional retention period should not exceed an additional five years.
That period should be without prejudice to national law setting out other data retention requirements allowing case-by-case decisions to facilitate criminal or administrative proceedings.
Access to those mechanisms should be on a need-to-know basis. Accurate identification and verification of data of natural and legal persons are essential for fighting money laundering or terrorist financing.
The latest technical developments in the digitalisation of transactions and payments enable a secure remote or electronic identification.
In addition, other secure remote or electronic identification processes, regulated, recognised, approved or accepted at national level by the national competent authority may be taken into account.
The principle of technology neutrality should be taken into account in the application of this Directive. In order to identify politically exposed persons in the Union, lists should be issued by Member States indicating the specific functions which, in accordance with national laws, regulations and administrative provisions, qualify as prominent public functions.
Member States should request each international organisation accredited on their territories to issue and keep up to date a list of prominent public functions at that international organisation.
The approach for the review of existing customers in the current framework is risk-based. However, given the higher risk of money laundering, terrorist financing and associated predicate offences associated with certain intermediary structures, that approach might not allow for the timely detection and assessment of risks.
It is therefore important to ensure that certain clearly specified categories of existing customers are also monitored on a regular basis. Member States are currently required to ensure that corporate and other legal entities incorporated within their territory obtain and hold adequate, accurate and current information on their beneficial ownership.
The need for accurate and up-to-date information on the beneficial owner is a key factor in tracing criminals who might otherwise be able to hide their identity behind a corporate structure.
The globally interconnected financial system makes it possible to hide and move funds around the world, and money launderers and terrorist financers as well as other criminals have increasingly made use of that possibility.
The specific factor determining which Member State is responsible for the monitoring and registration of beneficial ownership information of trusts and similar legal arrangements should be clarified.
Due to differences in the legal systems of Member States, certain trusts and similar legal arrangements are not monitored or registered anywhere in the Union.
Beneficial ownership information of trusts and similar legal arrangements should be registered where the trustees of trusts and persons holding equivalent positions in similar legal arrangements are established or where they reside.
In order to ensure the effective monitoring and registration of information on the beneficial ownership of trusts and similar legal arrangements, cooperation between Member States is also necessary.
Rules that apply to trusts and similar legal arrangements with respect to access to information relating to their beneficial ownership should be comparable to the corresponding rules that apply to corporate and other legal entities.
Due to the wide range of types of trusts that currently exists in the Union, as well as an even greater variety of similar legal arrangements, the decision on whether or not a trust or a similar legal arrangement is comparably similar to corporate and other legal entities should be taken by Member States.
The aim of the national law transposing those provisions should be to prevent the use of trusts or similar legal arrangements for the purposes of money laundering, terrorist financing or associated predicate offences.
With a view to the different characteristics of trusts and similar legal arrangements, Member States should be able, under national law and in accordance with data protection rules, to determine the level of transparency with regard to trusts and similar legal arrangements that are not comparable to corporate and other legal entities.
The risks of money laundering and terrorist financing involved can differ, based on the characteristics of the type of trust or similar legal arrangement and the understanding of those risks can evolve over time, for instance as a result of the national and supranational risk assessments.
For that reason, it should be possible for Member States to provide for wider access to information on beneficial ownership of trusts and similar legal arrangements, if such access constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure with the legitimate aim of preventing the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing.
When determining the level of transparency of the beneficial ownership information of such trusts or similar legal arrangements, Member States should have due regard to the protection of fundamental rights of individuals, in particular the right to privacy and protection of personal data.
Access to beneficial ownership information of trusts and similar legal arrangements should be granted to any person that can demonstrate a legitimate interest.
Access should also be granted to any person that files a written request in relation to a trust or similar legal arrangement which holds or owns a controlling interest in any corporate or other legal entity incorporated outside the Union, through direct or indirect ownership, including through bearer shareholdings, or through control via other means.
The criteria and conditions granting access to requests for beneficial ownership information of trusts and similar legal arrangements should be sufficiently precise and in line with the aims of this Directive.
It should be possible for Member States to refuse a written request where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the written request is not in line with the objectives of this Directive.
In order to ensure legal certainty and a level playing field, it is essential to clearly set out which legal arrangements established across the Union should be considered similar to trusts by effect of their functions or structure.
Therefore, each Member State should be required to identify the trusts, if recognised by national law, and similar legal arrangements that may be set up pursuant to its national legal framework or custom and which have structure or functions similar to trusts, such as enabling a separation or disconnection between the legal and the beneficial ownership of assets.
Thereafter, Member States should notify to the Commission the categories, description of the characteristics, names and where applicable legal basis of those trusts and similar legal arrangements in view of their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union in order to enable their identification by other Member States.
It should be taken into account that trusts and similar legal arrangements may have different legal characteristics throughout the Union.
Where the characteristics of the trust or similar legal arrangement are comparable in structure or functions to the characteristics of corporate and other legal entities, public access to beneficial ownership information would contribute to combating the misuse of trusts and similar legal arrangements, similar to the way public access can contribute to the prevention of the misuse of corporate and other legal entities for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing.
Public access to beneficial ownership information allows greater scrutiny of information by civil society, including by the press or civil society organisations, and contributes to preserving trust in the integrity of business transactions and of the financial system.
It can contribute to combating the misuse of corporate and other legal entities and legal arrangements for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, both by helping investigations and through reputational effects, given that anyone who could enter into transactions is aware of the identity of the beneficial owners.
It also facilitates the timely and efficient availability of information for financial institutions as well as authorities, including authorities of third countries, involved in combating such offences.
The access to that information would also help investigations on money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing.
Confidence in financial markets from investors and the general public depends in large part on the existence of an accurate disclosure regime that provides transparency in the beneficial ownership and control structures of companies.
This is particularly true for corporate governance systems that are characterised by concentrated ownership, such as the one in the Union.
On the one hand, large investors with significant voting and cash-flow rights may encourage long-term growth and firm performance.
On the other hand, however, controlling beneficial owners with large voting blocks may have incentives to divert corporate assets and opportunities for personal gain at the expense of minority investors.
The potential increase in confidence in financial markets should be regarded as a positive side effect and not the purpose of increasing transparency, which is to create an environment less likely to be used for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing.
Confidence in financial markets from investors and the general public depends in large part on the existence of an accurate disclosure regime that provides transparency in the beneficial ownership and control structures of corporate and other legal entities as well as certain types of trusts and similar legal arrangements.
Member States should therefore allow access to beneficial ownership information in a sufficiently coherent and coordinated way, by establishing clear rules of access by the public, so that third parties are able to ascertain, throughout the Union, who are the beneficial owners of corporate and other legal entities as well as of certain types of trusts and similar legal arrangements.
Member States should therefore allow access to beneficial ownership information on corporate and other legal entities in a sufficiently coherent and coordinated way, through the central registers in which beneficial ownership information is set out, by establishing a clear rule of public access, so that third parties are able to ascertain, throughout the Union, who are the beneficial owners of corporate and other legal entities.
It is essential to also establish a coherent legal framework that ensures better access to information relating to beneficial ownership of trusts and similar legal arrangements, once they are registered within the Union.
The set of data to be made available to the public should be limited, clearly and exhaustively defined, and should be of a general nature, so as to minimise the potential prejudice to the beneficial owners.
At the same time, information made accessible to the public should not significantly differ from the data currently collected.
In order to limit the interference with the right to respect for their private life in general and to protection of their personal data in particular, that information should relate essentially to the status of beneficial owners of corporate and other legal entities and of trusts and similar legal arrangements and should strictly concern the sphere of economic activity in which the beneficial owners operate.
In cases where the senior managing official has been identified as the beneficial owner only ex officio and not through ownership interest held or control exercised by other means, this should be clearly visible in the registers.
With regard to information on beneficial owners, Member States can provide for information on nationality to be included in the central register particularly for non-native beneficial owners.
In order to facilitate registry procedures and as the vast majority of beneficial owners will be nationals of the state maintaining the central register, Member States may presume a beneficial owner to be of their own nationality where no entry to the contrary is made.
The enhanced public scrutiny will contribute to preventing the misuse of legal entities and legal arrangements, including tax avoidance.
Therefore, it is essential that the information on beneficial ownership remains available through the national registers and through the system of interconnection of registers for a minimum of five years after the grounds for registering beneficial ownership information of the trust or similar legal arrangement have ceased to exist.
However, Member States should be able to provide by law for the processing of the information on beneficial ownership, including personal data for other purposes if such processing meets an objective of public interest and constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to the legitimate aim pursued.
Moreover, with the aim of ensuring a proportionate and balanced approach and to guarantee the rights to private life and personal data protection, it should be possible for Member States to provide for exemptions to the disclosure through the registers of beneficial ownership information and to access to such information, in exceptional circumstances, where that information would expose the beneficial owner to a disproportionate risk of fraud, kidnapping, blackmail, extortion, harassment, violence or intimidation.
It should also be possible for Member States to require online registration in order to identify any person who requests information from the register, as well as the payment of a fee for access to the information in the register.
This entails the adoption of technical measures and specifications which need to take account of differences between registers. In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Directive, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to tackle such technical and operational issues.
In any case, the involvement of Member States in the functioning of the whole system should be ensured by means of a regular dialogue between the Commission and the representatives of Member States on the issues concerning the operation of the system and on its future development.
As a consequence, natural persons whose personal data are held in national registers as beneficial owners should be informed accordingly.
In addition, to prevent the abuse of the information contained in the registers and to balance out the rights of beneficial owners, Member States might find it appropriate to consider making information relating to the requesting person along with the legal basis for their request available to the beneficial owner.
Where the reporting of discrepancies by the FIUs and competent authorities would jeopardise an on-going investigation, the FIUs or competent authorities should delay the reporting of the discrepancy until the moment at which the reasons for not reporting cease to exist.
Furthermore, FIUs and competent authorities should not report any discrepancy when this would be contrary to any confidentiality provision of national law or would constitute a tipping-off offence.
Access to information and the definition of legitimate interest should be governed by the law of the Member State where the trustee of a trust or person holding an equivalent position in a similar legal arrangement is established or resides.
Where the trustee of the trust or person holding equivalent position in similar legal arrangement is not established or does not reside in any Member State, access to information and the definition of legitimate interest should be governed by the law of the Member State where the beneficial ownership information of the trust or similar legal arrangement is registered in accordance with the provisions of this Directive.
Member States should define legitimate interest, both as a general concept and as a criterion for accessing beneficial ownership information in their national law.
In particular, those definitions should not restrict the concept of legitimate interest to cases of pending administrative or legal proceedings, and should enable to take into account the preventive work in the field of anti-money laundering, counter terrorist financing and associate predicate offences undertaken by non-governmental organisations and investigative journalists, where appropriate.
With a view to ensuring coherent and efficient registration and information exchange, Member States should ensure that their authority in charge of the register set up for the beneficial ownership information of trusts and similar legal arrangements cooperates with its counterparts in other Member States, sharing information concerning trusts and similar legal arrangements governed by the law of one Member State and administered in another Member State.
Accordingly, Member States, while requiring the adoption of enhanced due diligence measures in this particular context, should take into consideration that correspondent relationships do not include one-off transactions or the mere exchange of messaging capabilities.
Moreover, recognising that not all cross-border correspondent banking services present the same level of money laundering and terrorist financing risks, the intensity of the measures laid down in this Directive can be determined by application of the principles of the risk based approach and do not prejudge the level of money laundering and terrorist financing risk presented by the respondent financial institution.
It is important to ensure that anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing rules are correctly implemented by obliged entities.
In that context, Member States should strengthen the role of public authorities acting as competent authorities with designated responsibilities for combating money laundering or terrorist financing, including the FIUs, the authorities that have the function of investigating or prosecuting money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing, tracing and seizing or freezing and confiscating criminal assets, authorities receiving reports on cross-border transportation of currency and bearer-negotiable instruments and authorities that have supervisory or monitoring responsibilities aimed at ensuring compliance by obliged entities.
Member States should strengthen the role of other relevant authorities including anti-corruption authorities and tax authorities.
Member States should ensure effective and impartial supervision of all obliged entities, preferably by public authorities via a separate and independent national regulator or supervisor.
Criminals move illicit proceeds through numerous financial intermediaries to avoid detection. Therefore it is important to allow credit and financial institutions to exchange information not only between group members, but also with other credit and financial institutions, with due regard to data protection rules as set out in national law.
Competent authorities supervising obliged entities for compliance with this Directive should be able to cooperate and exchange confidential information, regardless of their respective nature or status.
The exchange of information and the provision of assistance between competent authorities of the Members States is essential for the purposes of this Directive.
Consequently, Member States should not prohibit or place unreasonable or unduly restrictive conditions on this exchange of information and provision of assistance.
With regard to this Directive, the legislator considers the transmission of such documents to be justified. Since the objective of this Directive, namely the protection of the financial system by means of prevention, detection and investigation of money laundering and terrorist financing, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, as individual measures adopted by Member States to protect their financial systems could be inconsistent with the functioning of the internal market and with the prescriptions of the rule of law and Union public policy, but can rather, by reason of the scale and effects of the action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union.
In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.
When drawing up a report evaluating the implementation of this Directive, the Commission should give due consideration to the respect of the fundamental rights and principles recognised by the Charter.
Member States should set up beneficial ownership registers for corporate and other legal entities by 10 January and for trusts and similar legal arrangements by 10 March Central registers should be interconnected via the European Central Platform by 10 March Member States should set up centralised automated mechanisms allowing the identification of holders of bank and payment accounts and safe-deposit boxes by 10 September The Commission shall make the report referred to in paragraph 1 available to Member States and obliged entities in order to assist them to identify, understand, manage and mitigate the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, and to allow other stakeholders, including national legislators, the European Parliament, the European Supervisory Authorities ESAs , and representatives from FIUs, to better understand the risks.
Reports shall be made public at the latest six months after having been made available to Member States, except for the elements of the reports which contain classified information.
Member States shall make the results of their risk assessments, including their updates, available to the Commission, the ESAs and the other Member States.
Other Member States may provide relevant additional information, where appropriate, to the Member State carrying out the risk assessment.
A summary of the assessment shall be made publicly available. That summary shall not contain classified information. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 64 in order to identify high-risk third countries, taking into account strategic deficiencies in particular in the following areas:.
The Commission, when drawing up the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 2, shall take into account relevant evaluations, assessments or reports drawn up by international organisations and standard setters with competence in the field of preventing money laundering and combating terrorist financing.
Member States shall prohibit their credit institutions and financial institutions from keeping anonymous accounts, anonymous passbooks or anonymous safe-deposit boxes.
Member States shall, in any event, require that the owners and beneficiaries of existing anonymous accounts, anonymous passbooks or anonymous safe-deposit boxes be subject to customer due diligence measures no later than 10 January and in any event before such accounts, passbooks or deposit boxes are used in any way.
Until May there was only one series of euro notes, however a new series, similar to the first one, is planned to be released. While broadly similar to the current notes, minor design changes include an updated map and a hologram of Europa.
It will be the first time when the Bulgarian Cyrillic alphabet is going to be used on the banknotes as a result of Bulgaria joining the European Union in The five euro note is the smallest at by 62 millimetres 4.
Like all euro notes, it contains the denomination, the EU flag , the signature of the president of the ECB and the initials of said bank in different EU languages , a depiction of EU territories overseas, the stars from the EU flag and twelve security features as listed below.
As a lower value note, the security features of the five euro note are not as high as the other denominations, however, it is protected by:.
The European Central Bank is closely monitoring the circulation and stock of the euro coins and banknotes.
It is a task of the Eurosystem to ensure an efficient and smooth supply of euro notes and to maintain their integrity throughout the euro area.
This is a net number, i. Besides the date of the introduction of the first set to January , the publication of figures is more significant through the maximum number of banknotes raised each year.
The number is higher the end of the year, except for this note in The first series of notes were issued in conjunction with those for a few weeks in the series 'Europe' until existing stocks are exhausted, then gradually withdrawn from circulation.
Both series thus run parallel but the proportion tends inevitably to a sharp decrease in the first series. Legally, both the European Central Bank and the central banks of the eurozone countries have the right to issue the 7 different euro banknotes.
In practice, only the national central banks of the zone physically issue and withdraw euro banknotes. The European Central Bank does not have a cash office and is not involved in any cash operations.
There are several communities of people at European level, most of which is EuroBillTracker ,  that, as a hobby, it keeps track of the euro banknotes that pass through their hands, to keep track and know where they travel or have travelled.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Main article: History of the euro. Design for the first series of five euro notes.
European Central Bank. Archived from the original on Retrieved 22 October Retrieved 9 July Retrieved 21 October Retrieved 7 August Retrieved 1 January Retrieved 6 August Retrieved 24 June